Quitting Cold Turkey?: Federal Preemption Doctrine and State Bans on FDA-Approved Drugs by Costello, Thomas A.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 3 Article 8
Quitting Cold Turkey?: Federal Preemption
Doctrine and State Bans on FDA-Approved Drugs
Thomas A. Costello
Copyright c 2018 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Thomas A. Costello, Quitting Cold Turkey?: Federal Preemption Doctrine and State Bans on FDA-
Approved Drugs, 26 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 839 (2018), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/
vol26/iss3/8
QUITTING COLD TURKEY?: FEDERAL PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE AND STATE BANS ON FDA-APPROVED DRUGS
Thomas A. Costello*
INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, the United States has struggled to deal with a massive
public health crisis stemming from the overprescription and abuse of opioids.1 Be-
tween legally prescribed analgesic pain medications, such as OxyContin®, and illegal
drugs, such as heroin, over 29,000 Americans died because of an overdose in 2015.2
Americans have become increasingly dependent on pain medications, with “more
than enough [opioid prescriptions] to give every American adult their own bottle of
pills” in 2012.3 The prescription opioid industry is massive, with an approximate value
of $8.34 billion in 2012.4
Given the vast size of this health epidemic, various efforts have been made by
state and federal governments. For example, in 2016, the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) announced new guidelines for prescribing opioid painkillers that focused on
limiting their prescription if possible.5 Additionally, in 2016, Congress approved and
President Obama signed the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act, which
largely focused on the symptoms of the epidemic—large numbers of opioid addicts—
as opposed to going after the underlying issue.6 In 2014, the Commonwealth of
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1 See generally Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVEN-
TION, http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/72VK-8RQ9]
(last updated Aug. 30, 2017) (providing general information on the opioid epidemic and its
many facets).
2 AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED., OPIOID ADDICTION: 2016 FACTS & FIGURES 1, http://
www.asam.org/docs/default-source/advocacy/opioid-addiction-disease-facts-figures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K43H-4TVG] (last visited Feb. 21, 2018).
3 Id. at 2.
4 Barry Meier & Bill Marsh, The Soaring Cost of the Opioid Economy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/06/23/sunday-review/the-soaring
-cost-of-the-opioid-economy.html.
5 See Deborah Dowell et al., CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain
United States, 2016, 315 JAMA 1624, 1641 (2016) (“[N]onopioid therapy is preferred for treat-
ment of chronic pain. Opioids should be used only when benefits for pain and function are
expected to outweigh risks.”).
6 See generally Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114
-198, 130 Stat. 695 (amending Titles 21 and 42 of the United States Code) (frequently referring
to opioid addicts as a population). Though the Act passed the Senate 92–2, divergent views
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Massachusetts attempted to tackle the opioid epidemic at what it perceived to be its
source—the widespread availability of prescription opioids—by illegalizing an FDA-
approved opioid before it went to market.7 Although other states have enacted restric-
tions on controversial FDA-approved drugs in the past,8 none have gone as far as to
ban the drug outright.9
Although that particular drug has not become a street drug of choice as regulators
feared,10 looking at Massachusetts’s public health legislation and the resulting litiga-
tion11 provides a unique opportunity to examine the constitutionality of a state banning
an FDA-approved drug without being preempted by federal law under the Supremacy
Clause.12 Using the backdrop of this situation, this Note will review the case law
regarding implied preemption and propose a return to a Wyeth v. Levine13 framework
for preemption decisions with modifications specifically allowing a state to ban an
FDA-approved drug in certain extremely limited conditions. Specifically, this frame-
work would add a value calculation into federal preemption doctrine that would
allow a court to factor in information discovered after a drug has been approved by the
FDA and a state’s immediate local concerns reflecting unique, exigent circumstances.
of the bill have emerged. Emmarie Huetteman, Senate Approves Bill to Combat Opioid Addic-
tion Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2kpNE2F. Compare Jessica Nickel,
Legislation Brings Hope to Those Shattered by Addiction, THE HILL (June 13, 2016, 8:37 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/282908-legislation-brings-hope-to-those
-shattered-by-addiction [https://perma.cc/D9YY-85NF] (calling the Senate and House bills
“better” and stating that they put us “within reach of tackling this epidemic”), with Presidential
Statement on Signing the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, 2016 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 22, 2016) (expressing deep disappointment that the Act did not
“provide any real resources” for addiction aid).
7 See Susan Heavey, Massachusetts Bans Sale of FDA-Approved Zogenix Painkiller,
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2014, 1:35 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drugs-opioids
-zogenix/massachusetts-bans-sale-of-fda-approved-zogenix-painkiller-idUSBREA2R1F920
140328 [https://perma.cc/X4AD-WPYL].
8 See Lars Noah, State Affronts to Federal Primacy in the Licensure of Pharmaceutical
Products, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 16–22, 25–26 (reviewing the history of states’ attempts to
restrict certain drugs or otherwise circumvent FDA approval or nonapproval decisions).
9 See generally id.
10 See Michael Specter, Who’s Afraid of Zohydro?, NEW YORKER (July 24, 2014), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/whos-afraid-of-zohydro [https://perma.cc/92C6
-LA5V].
11 See generally Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *3
(D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (upholding an injunction against a Massachusetts law that banned
Zohydro); Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at *5 (D. Mass.
July 8, 2014) (upholding the Massachusetts ban on preemption grounds), vacated in part, No.
14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251 (D. Mass. Aug. 28, 2014).
12 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13 See 555 U.S. 555, 577–81 (2009) (holding a Vermont law was not preempted by fed-
eral regulation).
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The Wyeth framework is superior to the current implied preemption framework,
as represented by Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett,14 as it grants states more
leniency in crafting policy attuned to their needs. Such a modified framework would
expand on those benefits by allowing rapid responses to urgent state needs that may
not have been fully reflected in the FDA’s approval process, thereby providing a
method for states to force technological progress through economic incentive.
In order to create this modified framework, this Note will first examine the
current case law surrounding implied federal preemption under the Supremacy
Clause. Part I will discuss the opioid epidemic specifically in the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, as well as the legislation pursued by Governor Patrick and litigation
that it prompted. Part II will examine three Supreme Court cases that all play a
significant role in current preemption jurisprudence and directly relate to the Zogenix
v. Patrick15 litigation. After reviewing the case law, Part III will establish the modi-
fied framework and lay out the positives and negatives of allowing that amount of
state freedom from preemption. Additionally, this Part will apply the modified
framework to the Zogenix facts as an example of how a case might turn out under
this framework. Finally, Part IV will use the recent immigration case of Arizona v.
United States16 to demonstrate that this modification would not significantly hurt
object preemption analysis outside the prescription drug context.
Overall, this Note will show that a slight modification to the federal preemption
doctrine under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution is both beneficial and sup-
portable under current case law. And in the case of the opioid epidemic, this modified
framework could even be lifesaving.
I. ZOGENIX V. PATRICK
In October 2013, the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) approved Zohydro
ER®, “the first FDA-approved single-entity . . . and extended-release” opioid anal-
gesic available in the United States.17 Not combined with any other analgesic, Zohydro
ER contains pure hydrocodone, a then-standard ingredient contained in opioid pain-
killers such as Vicodin.18 Designed to allow doctors flexibility in prescriptions for those
requiring “daily, around-the-clock, long-term” pain management,19 the extended-
release nature of Zohydro, along with its pure hydrocodone formula, meant it could
14 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2476–78 (2013).
15 Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696.
16 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
17 News Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Extended-Release, Single-
Entity Hydrocodone Product (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom
/pressannouncements/ucm372287.htm [https://perma.cc/RSS8-K9K3].
18 Id.; see Matthew Perrone, FDA Approves More Powerful, Pure Hydrocodone Drug,
BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 26, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/10/25/fda-approves
-more-powerful-pure-hydrocodone-drug/AGTqSQGTFkkB55h761gnAN/story.html [https://
perma.cc/K7ML-HR3D].
19 News Release, supra note 17.
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be significantly stronger than comparable opioids on the market.20 Although this was
relatively safe when taken as directed, without abuse-resistant measures, an opioid
addict could easily crush and snort the drug, immediately accessing the greater
amount of hydrocodone.21
The FDA’s decision to approve Zohydro explicitly rejected the recommendation
of its Anesthetic and Analgesic Drug Products Advisory Committee, which had voted
11–2, with one abstention, against approving another nonabuse-resistant opioid pain-
killer.22 The approval brought criticism and condemnation from medical profession-
als,23 state attorneys general,24 and other groups concerned with the ongoing national
addiction crisis.25 A few months after the FDA’s approval of Zohydro, Governor Deval
Patrick of Massachusetts, fearing an expansion of the opioid epidemic, declared a
public health emergency and authorized the Department of Public Health to “prohibit
the prescribing and dispensing of Zohydro ER until DPH determined that adequate
measures to safeguard against diversion, overdose, and misuse had been imple-
mented.”26 The case that inspired this Note followed soon after.
20 See Matthew Perrone, 28 States Ask FDA to Rethink Painkiller Approval, NEWSOK
(Dec. 12, 2013, 12:09 PM), http://newsok.com/article/feed/627227 [https://perma.cc/PKN8
-QPGM] (“The pill uses an extended release formulation that is reportedly five to 10 times more
potent than currently available hydrocodone combination pills.”).
21 See Noah, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing difference between taking a pill as directed and
crushing it).
22 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RISK AS-
SESSMENT AND RISK MITIGATION REVIEW(S): ZOHYDRO ER (HYDROCODONE BITARTRATE)
2 (2013) [hereinafter RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MITIGATION REVIEW(S): ZOHYDRO ER];
see also Catherine M. Sharkey, States v. FDA, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1609, 1620–26 (2015)
(discussing in greater detail the process the FDA goes through to seek public and professional
comments on a potential pharmaceutical). See generally Advisory Committees: Critical to the
FDA’s Product Review Process, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/re
sourcesforyou/consumers/ucm143538.htm [https://perma.cc/HNT4-AGLH] (discussing how
the FDA employs advisory committees in the drug approval process).
23 See Peter Loftus, Doctors Split on Zohydro, a Longer-Lasting Painkiller, WALL ST. J.
(May 26, 2014, 7:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/doctors-split-on-zohydro-a-longer
-lasting-painkiller-1401137975 [https://web.archive.org/save/https://www.wsj.com/articles
/doctors-split-on-zohydro-a-longer-lasting-painkiller-1401137975/].
24 See Prescription Narcotics Are Potent Painkillers, But They Can Be Deadly, WASH.
POST (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/prescription
-narcotics-are-potent-painkillers-but-they-can-be-deadly/2014/11/10/2498ffc8-2259-11e4
-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.14cd70203504 [https://perma.cc/VL4J-YCM5]
(“[A]ttorneys general from 28 states have asked the FDA to reconsider its decision . . . .”).
25 See Barry Meier, Addiction Specialists Wary of New Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15,
2013), https://nyti.ms/2FNYKJK; Critics Question FDA’s Approval of Zohydro, NATIONAL
PUBLIC RADIO (Feb. 26, 2014) (transcript available at https://www.npr.org/2014/02/26/28283
6473/critics-question-fdas-approval-of-zohydro [https://web.archive.org/web/20171013041006
/http://www.npr.org/2014/02/26/282836473/critics-question-fdas-approval-of-zohydro])
(“Forty-two public health groups are urging the FDA to withdraw its support of Zohydro.”).
26 Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 15,
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Zogenix, Inc., a California-based pharmaceutical company, filed a complaint in
the District Court of Massachusetts, seeking a preliminary injunction against what
it saw as an unconstitutional violation of the Supremacy Clause.27 Judge Rya Zobel
granted the injunction, stating that the ban was likely unconstitutional as it would
“obstruct the FDA’s Congressionally-given charge.”28 By demanding an abuse-
resistant formula before it can be sold in Massachusetts, a development that according
to the FDA was still in its “nascent stages,”29 the state was substituting its own judg-
ments for that of the FDA and would require Zogenix to return to the FDA for
another approval.30 Seeing that as an unconstitutional obstruction of the purpose of
the FDA, Judge Zobel granted the preliminary injunction.31
Instead of challenging the grant, and perhaps allowing a higher court to elucidate
if any circumstances would allow a state to ban an FDA-approved pharmaceutical,
following the injunction Governor Patrick passed restrictions on when and how a
healthcare provider may prescribe Zohydro.32 Again, Zogenix challenged these re-
strictions, especially the requirement of a letter of medical necessity stating that
other potential drugs had failed, describing them as a “de facto ban” on Zohydro.33
2014) (order granting preliminary injunction); see also Brian MacQuarrie, Governor
Declares an Emergency on Opiate Abuse, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 27, 2014), https://www.boston
globe.com/metro/2014/03/27/with-heroin-overdoses-rise-gov-patrick-declares-public-health
-emergency-mass/hOajTIJNKnSHKAnWjZ6wYL/story.html [https://web.archive.org/web
/20170216002323/https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/03/27/with-heroin-overdoses
-rise-gov-patrick-declares-public-health-emergency-mass/hOajTIJNKnSHKAnWjZ6wYL
/story.html].
27 Complaint at 14, Zogenix, No. 1:14-cv-11689, 2014 WL 1454696; Zohydro Maker
Sues to Block Massachusetts Ban, WBUR (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.wbur.org/news/2014
/04/08/zohydro-lawsuit-massachusetts-ban [https://perma.cc/H78R-BP3K].
28 Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2.
29 CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY
REVIEW FOR REGULATORY ACTION: ZOHYDRO ER 32 (2013), http://www.accessdata.fda
.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2013/202880Orig1s000SumR.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5EY-HERN]
(“[T]he technology used to produce abuse-deterrent opioid formulations is still in the nascent
stages . . . . If and when they . . . are able to create an abuse-deterrent formulation that re-
mains safe and effective for patients, we would certainly give serious consideration to assuring
that any non-abuse formulations are removed from the market.”).
30 Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2.
31 Id. at *2–3.
32 Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at *1–2 (D. Mass.
July 8, 2014), vacated in part, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251 (D. Mass. Aug. 28,
2014) (describing the required procedures under 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07(25) (2014) and
247 MASS. CODE REGS. 8.05(3) (2014)). These requirements, in relevant part, included a letter
of medical necessity before prescribing a pure hydrocodone drug, of which Zohydro ER was
the only one available, and restrictions on who may handle pure hydrocodone products, limiting
it exclusively to pharmacists or assistants under direct supervision. Id.
33 Verified Third Amended Complaint at 29, Zogenix, No. 1:14-cv-11689-RWZ, 2014
WL 1454696.
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Once more, Judge Zobel sided with Zogenix, finding that the letter intentionally
turned Zohydro into a drug of last resort, and issued a secondary injunction under
a similar implied object preemption analysis.34 This injunction would last until
Massachusetts loosened the required statement on the letter, putting the restriction
in line with the FDA’s recommended use for Zohydro.35
Though Judge Zobel believed Zogenix to be the likely winner in a trial on the
merits, finding object preemption in both the physical ban and the “de facto ban,”
this is not definitive.36 Without an appeal, the issue has not been satisfactorily
resolved and deserves a deeper investigation.
II. CURRENT SUPREME COURT PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
Judge Zobel based her grant of a preliminary injunction in both cases solely on
the idea implied object preemption prohibited the state action.37 Federal preemption
doctrine stems from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which states, “This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.”38 Under this Clause, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that state laws in direct conflict with federal laws are “without effect.”39 State laws
may either be explicitly preempted by federal law, in the case where a federal statute
expressly mentions preemption,40 or impliedly preempted. Implied preemption arises
in three situations: (1) where federal law has entirely occupied a field of law,41 (2)
where compliance with a federal law and a state law are mutually exclusive,42 and
(3) where a state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
34 Zogenix, 2014 WL 3339610, at *4–5.
35 Zogenix, 2014 WL 4273251, at *2 (finding that Massachusetts had omitted the trouble-
some language; instead of “other pain management treatments must have ‘failed,’ now they
must be ‘inadequate’” (quoting 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07(25)(a); 263 MASS. CODE REGS.
5.07(12)(a))).
36 See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2; Zogenix, 2014 WL 3339610, at *2, *5.
37 See Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1–2; Zogenix, 2014 WL 3339610, at *2, *4–5.
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
39 See, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).
40 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 595–96, 600 (2011) (dis-
cussing the express preemption provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2)).
41 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66–67 (1941) (regarding the field of immigra-
tion, the Court stated: “[W]here the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority
in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard
for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, con-
flict . . . the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations.”).
42 See, e.g., PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617–18 (2011) (discussing impossibility
in a case of federal drug labeling).
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the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”43 In all preemption cases, however,
“[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone”44 in determining the scope of
preemption. Finally, the Supreme Court “start[s] with the assumption that the his-
toric police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”45
Within this wide-spanning doctrine, two seemingly incongruent results have
emerged from the Supreme Court in the context of FDA-approved pharmaceuti-
cals.46 Although these cases focus primarily on state tort liability and FDA labeling,
the discussions of implied object and impossibility preemption are essential to a
complete understanding of Judge Zobel’s decision in Zogenix. This Note, therefore,
will examine each case individually, along with a third case outside of the pharma-
ceutical context, upon which Judge Zobel also seems to base her preliminary injunction.
A. Wyeth v. Levine
As one of the major cases that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts relied on
in defense of its ban, Wyeth v. Levine is perhaps the most beneficial case towards the
state, even though the Court’s holding deals primarily with state tort law.47 In that
case, an FDA-approved antihistamine for treating nausea, Phenergan®, was given
to a patient using a method of injection known as an IV-push.48 Following the
treatment, the plaintiff lost a forearm to gangrene due to a complication that had not
been explicitly stated on the warning label.49 The drug’s manufacturer, Wyeth, now
part of Pfizer, claimed that allowing a state tort action against a drug manufacturer
whose label had received FDA approval would create an unconstitutional “obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress,” and thus should be preempted.50
43 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (finding obstacle preemption in a state tort liability case).
44 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn,
375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
45 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). There is some
disagreement between the Supreme Court Justices as to whether this applies strictly to a de-
termination of whether Congress intended preemption or more broadly to the scope of invalida-
tion of state law once preemption is found as well. See id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545–46 (1992)).
46 Compare Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1–2
(D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (discussing implied obstacle preemption), with Mensing, 564 U.S. at
617–18 (discussing impossibility preemption).
47 See generally 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
48 Id. at 558–59 (mentioning the difference between an IV-push and other methods of
injection).
49 Id. at 559–60.
50 Id. at 563–64 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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The Court began its analysis with an investigation into the Congressional purpose
of the FDA by examining its authorizing legislation and amendments.51 Among
other things, this brief history focused on the expansion of FDA powers in the name
of health and safety52 and the efforts Congress took to maintain state law without
expressly preempting it.53 After a discussion of impossibility preemption, in which
the Court maintained that impossibility is “a demanding defense” and found Wyeth
able to comply with state warning requirements and the FDA’s label adjustment
rules,54 Justice Stevens began the more relevant discussion of object preemption.
Although Wyeth sought to categorize FDA approval as a “‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling’
with respect to drug labeling,”55 Justice Stevens found that argument to be against
Congress’s general unwillingness to provide an alternative remedy in place of state
inadequate warning tort suits56 and unwillingness to enact an express preemption
clause like those in place for medical devices,57 nonprescription drugs,58 and cosme-
tics.59 Further, the Court repeated its judgment that “[t]he case for federal pre-emption
is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of
state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both
concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.”60
The Court also examined the preamble to an FDA regulation that Wyeth asserted
granted preemptive force to the FDA’s approval of labeling.61 In that preamble, the
FDA, not Congress, asserted the preemptive force of its own regulation, calling it
a floor and a ceiling.62 The Court noted that while an agency’s opinion on the
51 Id. at 566.
52 Id. at 566–67.
53 Id. at 567. Specifically, Congress enacted a savings clause which stated that a state law
could only be preempted on a finding of a “direct and positive conflict.” Drug Amendments of
1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793. Additionally, Congress refused to write an
express preemption clause for prescription drugs, unlike medical devices and nonprescription
drugs. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567.
54 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 (finding that Wyeth did have options beyond repetitioning the
FDA for a new label that could have warned victim).
55 Brief for Petitioner at 45, Wyeth, 555 U.S. 555 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2273067, at
*22 (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3935 (2006)).
56 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574 (“Evidently, [Congress] determined that widely available state
rights of action provided appropriate relief for injured consumers. It may also have recognized
that state-law remedies further consumer protection by motivating manufacturers to produce
safe and effective drugs and to give adequate warnings.” (citation omitted)).
57 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012); see Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 574.
58 21 U.S.C. § 379r(e) (2012).
59 21 U.S.C. § 379s(d) (2012).
60 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489
U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)).
61 Id.; see also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (2006).
62 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575.
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preemptive power of its own regulation may have some weight, it is certainly not
conclusory.63 Finally, the majority discussed the benefits of state tort claims in finding
potentially undiscovered dangers in FDA-approved drugs.64 When all is said and
done, Wyeth shows the Court at its most sympathetic with regards to states’ rights
in the field of pharmaceuticals. If the Commonwealth had any chance of succeeding
on the merits in Zogenix v. Patrick, it was almost certainly due to this case.65
The concurring opinion by Justice Thomas in Wyeth is worth briefly mention-
ing, although an in-depth examination of his argument is beyond the scope of this
Note. In his concurrence, Justice Thomas concluded that obstacle preemption itself
is not an appropriate analysis when looking for unconstitutional violations of the
Supremacy Clause.66 While Justice Thomas seemed content to allow implied pre-
emption based on impossibility to continue, his concurrence with the majority opinion
was not based on agreement with their methodology, but instead rested exclusively
on his belief that state tort law cannot be preempted by Congressional object, since
no state law can.67 This would significantly strengthen the case of Massachusetts in
Zogenix. However, Justice Thomas elaborated that he would also expand impossibil-
ity preemption from a true impossibility standard to a clear and direct conflict
standard.68 It appears that this view may have caught on amongst the more conserva-
tive Justices, as the majority in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett did not refer
to implied object preemption in any form in its opinion, nor did it cite to Wyeth in
support of its analysis.69
B. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
University of Florida law professor Lars Noah notes, in his Article on possible
constitutional defenses for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in Zogenix, that
Judge Zobel did not even mention Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. in her grant of the
preliminary injunction against the ban on Zohydro.70 Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
63 Id. at 576–77; see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)
(also noting the importance of the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation).
64 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 578–79 (discussing relative abilities to monitor post-approval
pharmaceuticals between the FDA and drug manufacturers).
65 See infra Part I.
66 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I can no longer assent to a doctrine
that pre-empts state laws merely because they ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of federal law . . . .” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))).
67 Id.
68 See id. at 589–94; see also Noah, supra note 8, at 30 n.114.
69 See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
70 Noah, supra note 8, at 34–35 (“For some reason, however, Judge Zobel had not cited
Bartlett to buttress her sense that federal law preempted Massachusetts’s effort to ban Zohydro,
perhaps because she thought that the case before her raised questions of implied preemption
based solely on frustration of purposes rather than impossibility of dual compliance.”).
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was sparked when a generic prescription nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug known
as sulindac, manufactured by Mutual Pharmaceutical, caused a patient to contract
toxic epidermal necrolysis.71 The victim sued under two causes of action offered by
the state of New Hampshire: failure-to-warn, which was dismissed by the trial court,
and design-defect.72
According to the majority, in New Hampshire, the design-defect tort imposes
a positive duty on the manufacturer to design a relatively safe product.73 This in turn
places a duty on drug manufacturers to either increase the usefulness of the drug,
reduce the risk of danger, or to increase the presence or efficiency of the warning
label already on the drug.74 Being a generic drug manufacturer, however, Mutual
Pharmaceutical was subject to strict rules regarding formula and label change, often
stricter than those affecting a name-brand drug manufacturer.75 Both generic and
name-brand drugs are not allowed to make any significant changes to the formula
of the prescription.76 However, only generic drug manufacturers are forbidden from
unilaterally changing their FDA-approved labeling.77 Essentially, the generic drug
manufacturers were trapped. If they tried to increase the value of the product or
minimize the risk, the manufacturer would run into the prohibition against changing
the formula.78 If instead the manufacturer attempted to change the warning labels,
it would be stopped by the relevant code provision.79 Thus, according to the major-
ity, an impossibility had been reached and the state tort claim was preempted.80
The Court explicitly rejected a claim made by the plaintiff, which would have
significant repercussions in Zogenix if Judge Zobel had done an impossibility
preemption analysis.81 The plaintiff claimed that if a company could not change its
71 133 S. Ct. at 2472.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 2473.
74 See id. at 2475 (quoting Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 147 N.H. 150,
154 (2001)).
75 Id.
76 See id. at 2471 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i) (2012)). These restrictions specific-
ally limit any qualitative or quantitative change to the formula, including inactive ingredients.
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i).
77 See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617 (2011) (“Federal drug regulations, as
interpreted by the FDA, prevented the Manufacturers from independently changing their ge-
neric drugs’ safety labels.”); see also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v) (2012) (requiring generic
drugs to use the same label as approved for its brand-name equivalent). A fair amount of atten-
tion has been paid to PLIVA, mostly by detractors arguing against its holding. See, e.g., Stacey
B. Lee, PLIVA v. Mensing: Generic Consumers’ Unfortunate Hand, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y
L. & ETHICS 209, 235–45 (2012) (looking at the potential repercussions in the huge generic
pharmaceuticals industry).
78 See Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2471 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(i)); see
also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
79 See PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 617.
80 Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
81 See id. at 2477.
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label, nor could it change its formula, it could avoid its duty entirely by simply not sell-
ing in New Hampshire any longer.82 The Court swiftly rejected this argument, stating:
We reject this “stop-selling” rationale as incompatible with our pre-
emption jurisprudence. Our pre-emption cases presume that an
actor seeking to satisfy both his federal- and state-law obligations
is not required to cease acting altogether in order to avoid liability.
Indeed, if the option of ceasing to act defeated a claim of impossi-
bility, impossibility pre-emption would be “all but meaningless.”83
The majority concluded by reaffirming that there was impossibility preemption here
and that a company’s ability to withdraw from a market does not affect the impossibil-
ity it faced between state tort liability and federal labeling laws.84
In a short dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, rejected the impossibil-
ity argument of the majority and returned to a Wyeth v. Levine true impossibility
standard, finding no impossibility in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. with the option to
stop selling or pay a fine.85 The dissent continued, however, that sizeable damages
may invoke object preemption.86 Further, Breyer discussed the amount of leeway that
should be given to the FDA’s determinations of preemption, weighing factors such
as opportunity for the public to comment,87 consistency of the FDA’s view of pre-
emption, and, most significantly, the fact that “the question of pre-emption may call
for considerable drug-related expertise. Indeed, one might infer that, the more
medically valuable the drug, the less likely Congress intended to permit a State to
drive it from the marketplace.”88 In this case, Breyer found the FDA and drug manu-
facturers could not produce a “convincing reason” that forcing the manufacturer to
either remove the drug from New Hampshire or be subject to liability would under-
cut the object of the FDA, and so believed the state tort was not preempted.89
In a separate dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, expanded
on the Breyer dissent, diving deeper into an analysis of both impossibility and object
preemption.90 Much of this dissent focused on the complementary role that state
laws serve in with regards to the federal drug regulation of the FDA.91
82 Id. at 2477.
83 Id. (quoting PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 621).
84 Id. at 2477–79 (discussing PLIVA).
85 Id. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is not literally impossible here for a company
like petitioner to comply with conflicting state and federal law.” (emphasis added)).
86 Id. at 2481.
87 Id.; see also Sharkey, supra note 22 (developing a framework for preemption decisions
that focused on opportunity for public comment).
88 Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 2482.
90 Id. at 2482–96 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 2483–85 (“Congress’ preservation of a role for state law . . . reflects a realistic
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C. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
One other case warrants an in-depth look, as it was significantly featured in
Judge Zobel’s grant of a preliminary injunction.92 Although Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co.93 is not within the prescription drug context, it is an essential case to fed-
eral preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause. In that case, a defective
design suit was brought against American Honda, alleging that Honda was negligent
in not installing driver’s side airbags in the car.94 After examining an express
preemption clause found in the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 and finding it inapplicable due to a saving clause,95 the Court examined a claim
of implied object preemption.96 After a lengthy examination of the legislative history
of the standard in question, the Court ruled that there was an actual conflict between
the state tort action and the safety standard from the Department of Transportation
at issue, resulting in preemption.97
The Court held that the legislative history pointed to “the standard deliberately
provid[ing] the manufacturer with a range of choices among different passive
restraint devices. Those choices would bring about a mix of different devices
introduced gradually over time . . . which would promote FMVSS 208’s safety
objectives.”98 Because the legislation was specifically designed to create a mix of
safety measures, requiring a manufacturer to have a driver’s side airbag or face a
design-defect claim was an obstacle to the object of the federal statute.99 Although
this case is not immediately applicable to the FDA drug approval context, it is ex-
tremely relevant to the Zogenix case, especially because the FDA explicitly stated
one purpose of approving Zohydro ER was to “offer prescribers an additional
therapeutic option to treat pain . . . because individual patients may respond differ-
ently to different opioids.”100
understanding of the limitations of ex ante federal regulatory review in this context. On its own,
even rigorous preapproval clinical testing of drugs is ‘generally . . . incapable of detecting
adverse effects that occur infrequently [or] have long latency periods . . . .’” (quoting David A.
Kessler & David C. Vladcek, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-
to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 471 (2008))).
92 See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696 (D. Mass.
Apr. 15, 2014).
93 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
94 Id. at 865.
95 See id. at 867–68.
96 See id. at 874–86.
97 See id.
98 Id. at 875 (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984)).
99 Id. at 881 (“Such a state law . . . would have required manufacturers of all similar cars
to install airbags rather than other passive restraint systems . . . . It thereby would have presented
an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that the federal regulation sought.”).
100 Susan Jeffrey, FDA Okays First Single-Entity Extended Release Hydrocodone, MEDSCAPE
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III. CREATION OF THE MODEL AND APPLICATION TO ZOGENIX
Although not completely incompatible, Wyeth v. Levine, Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co. v. Bartlett, and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. could certainly use “Con-
gress’ ‘explicit’ resolution of the difficult pre-emption questions that arise in the
prescription drug context. That issue has repeatedly vexed the Court—and produced
widely divergent views—in recent years.”101 Absent such a direct policy statement
by Congress, a workable, consistent theory of implied preemption would signifi-
cantly benefit states, such as Massachusetts in Zogenix, looking to avoid preemption
moving forward. This Note proposes a return to a Wyeth interpretation of implied
preemption, abandoning the Justice Thomas concurrence model, which has seem-
ingly become the standard post–Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.102 This model is designed
specifically to allow states freedom to enact their particular regulatory schemes
through tort liability or, in some cases, a ban on a particular drug.
Before building such a model, it is important to examine why that amount of
freedom is beneficial and address possible criticisms. Allowing failure-to-warn and
design-defect tort claims against drug manufacturers serves two major purposes: it
allows for monitoring beyond the limited scope of the FDA103 and drives companies
to produce safer, more effective drugs.104 A similar rationale can and should be
applied to a ban on an FDA-approved prescription drug. Zogenix v. Patrick provides
a perfect example of a situation where enforcement of a ban could have pressed
technology forward.105 If the only way a drug manufacturer could sell a pharmaceu-
tical in a certain state was to incorporate abuse-resistant technology, a potentially
powerful counter to the ongoing addiction crisis, the manufacturer would almost
certainly respond by developing an abuse-resistant formula.106
(Oct. 25, 2013), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/813236 [https://web.archive.org
/web/20150114041016/https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/813236].
101 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555 (2009); PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011)).
102 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
103 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 578–79 (discussing limited monitoring ability of FDA after
approval of a pharmaceutical).
104 Id. at 579 n.12 (“[S]tate tort suits ‘can serve as a catalyst’ by aiding in the exposure of
new dangers . . . .” (quoting Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 554 U.S. 431, 451 (2005))).
105 See No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696 at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (order grant-
ing preliminary injunction) (“[T]he drug Massachusetts wants Zogenix to adopt—Zohydro
ER with an ‘abuse-resistant formulation’—has not been approved by the FDA. To satisfy the
Commonwealth, Zogenix would be required to return to the FDA and seek approval of a drug
different from the one the FDA has already deemed safe.”).
106 See, e.g., News Release, Zogenix, Zogenix Submits Modified Formulation of Zohydro ER
with Potential Abuse Deterrent Properties for FDA Review (Oct. 1, 2014), http://ir.zogenix
.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=220862&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1972777 [https://perma.cc/3Y6R
-G9YE]. Although the ban in Massachusetts did not last, the public outcry against Zohydro
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Beyond this economic incentive towards safer prescriptions, however, a state’s
ability to ban a drug can reflect local concerns that are not adequately captured by
the FDA’s risk-benefit analysis. According to the CDC, in 2014, the year of the
Zogenix litigation, Massachusetts had the thirteenth highest age-adjusted rate of drug
overdose, primarily driven by opioids.107 While it may not have had as acute prob-
lems with drug overdose as West Virginia,108 a state in the position of Massachusetts
should be able to respond to certain local conditions that might not exist on the same
scale at the national level.109 Although access to additional opioid options nation-
wide may be a net benefit under the FDA’s decision-making, in these hard-hit areas
another opioid may not be the answer. Additionally, a state is better equipped to
respond quickly to changing situations and rapidly developing crises than the FDA.
Although it has some strong benefits, allowing states to unilaterally ban a spe-
cific FDA-approved pharmaceutical is not a panacea; there are legitimate criticisms
from a policy standpoint. Perhaps the most significant concern is that states could
use this ability to reject various socially contentious prescriptions, such as contra-
ceptives and abortifacients.110 However, if a state did try to block these drugs, a
constitutional challenge under existing Supreme Court privacy and equal protection
jurisprudence would quickly take care of the unconstitutional state legislation.111
ER may have contributed to the rapid submission of an NDA for an abuse-resistant formu-
lation of the drug in October 2014, less than two months after the end of Zogenix’s litigation
as part of Zogenix v. Patrick. See id.
107 See Drug Overdose Death Data, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/V6NJ-V67A] (last
updated Dec. 19, 2017).
108 See id. (listing West Virginia as the state with the overall highest age-adjusted rate of
drug overdose in 2014); see also Noah, supra note 8, at 6 (“Although it had not encountered
the problems with OxyContin experienced by West Virginia and other states in the Appalachian
region, officials in Massachusetts knew of that drug’s scourge . . . .” (citations omitted)).
109 See, e.g., Nadja Popovich, A Deadly Crisis: Mapping the Spread of America’s Drug
Overdose Epidemic, GUARDIAN (May 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/society/ng
-interactive/2016/may/25/opioid-epidemic-overdose-deaths-map [https://perma.cc/9EWX
-U8MV] (mapping skyrocketing overdose rates, driven mainly by opioid overdoses, specifically
concentrated in Central Appalachia, the Southwest, the Pacific Northwest, Florida, and to a
certain extent, New England).
110 For a discussion of previous attempts to block socially contentious drugs without resort-
ing to an outright post-approval ban, see Noah, supra note 8, at 16–27 (detailing state attempts
to block FDA-approved drugs and to allow non-FDA-approved drugs such as marijuana).
111 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (establishing the
undue burden test for access to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (find-
ing a state ban on contraceptives violates the constitutional right to privacy). According to the
CDC, approximately 20% of abortions use a combination of FDA-approved mifepristone and
misoprostol, probably leading to a finding of undue burden. See KAREN PAZOL ET AL., CTRS.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ABORTION SURVEILLANCE—UNITED STATES, 2012,
at 39 tbl.22 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6410a1.htm?s_cid=ss6410
a1_e [https://perma.cc/2JGL-FGAT].
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Another common contention against allowing states to ban prescriptions is the idea
that FDA approval should bring uniformity in access to all states.112 Although uni-
formity of drug availability might be of great significance to the manufacturer seeking
approval of a new, expensive drug,113 FDA approval only “represents a necessary
but hardly sufficient condition for patient access.”114
Another major benefit of uniformity of access in the pharmaceutical context is
community immunity from vaccines.115 If a state were to ban a vaccine solely within
its borders, the resulting unvaccinated population could threaten the health of the
United States.116 While this is a valid concern, it is highly unlikely that a state’s local
concerns surrounding a vaccine could ever meet the exacting standard this Note
recommends before allowing an un-preempted ban. Finally, a critic may claim that,
in the case of opioids in particular, trying to ban access to a drug is a moot point due
to the sheer size of the pill mill industry.117 This is easily countered by the idea that
even though a prescription is accessible immediately across the border, the state is
acting in what it believes is the best interest of its citizens by making it substantially
more difficult to obtain. Although allowing states to ban FDA approved drugs has
some serious drawbacks, the benefits derived from state self-determination and
possible enhanced research and development to meet more exacting standards make
the trade-off worth it.
Having established the importance of allowing the states to unilaterally ban at
least some FDA-approved drugs, this Note will now formulate a framework for
preemption cases under the Supremacy Clause using the precedents found in Geier,
Wyeth, and Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. Specifically, it will advocate a Wyeth type
framework with small modifications to ensure a state’s right to ban drugs in certain
112 See, e.g., Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165–68 (1978) (finding that a Depart-
ment of Transportation regulation on tanker design preempted more stringent state restrictions,
as it “would frustrate the congressional desire of achieving uniform, international standards”).
113 In the pharmaceuticals case, uniformity and ability to sell in every state might be prompted
by the need to recoup losses from excessively high new drug research and development
costs. See Jason Millman, Does It Really Cost $2.6 Billion to Develop a New Drug?, WASH.
POST: WONKBLOG (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014
/11/18/does-it-really-cost-2-6-billion-to-develop-a-new-drug/ [https://perma.cc/K56L-B2W2]
(discussing price of research and development and pharmaceutical industry efforts to recoup
that amount).
114 Noah, supra note 8, at 10–12 (“[S]ponsors of genuinely promising investigational
products can decide not to seek FDA approval; . . . license holders generally have no obligation
to commercialize their products, to do so at an affordable price, or in a manner that ensures
easy access. Lastly, FDA approval does not invariably guarantee insurance coverage . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
115 Vaccines Protect Your Community, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://
www.vaccines.gov/basics/work/ [https://perma.cc/C8JE-ZNQG] (last reviewed Dec. 2017).
116 See id.
117 See generally Meier & Marsh, supra note 4 (listing various statistics on the opioid
economy, including the prevalence of “doctor shopping” and “pill mills”).
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contexts. Finally, this Note will apply the framework to Zogenix v. Patrick as an
example of how a case would turn out. Unlike the majority in Mutual Pharmaceuti-
cal Co. and the Justice Thomas concurrence in Wyeth, this Note will assume that
object preemption is still a valuable part of the Supremacy Clause jurisprudence,
otherwise “the vast majority—if not all—of the cases in which the Court has found”
object “pre-emption, were wrongly decided.”118
A. Object Preemption
As in any discussion of implied object preemption, the starting point for this
model is the assumption that the police powers of the state are not preempted, unless
that was the clear intent of the federal statute as determined by its purpose and
object.119 Therefore, without developing a uniform statement of intent for the FDA,
developing a consistent method of determining preemption of state statutes is nearly
impossible. Many different documents and statements have been presented as demon-
strating Congress’s intent through the FDA, though most tend to focus on protecting
public health, the lack of any opposing statements of intent, and the testimony of
FDA employees.120 Like the Court in Wyeth, this framework does not see FDA
approval as a “floor and a ceiling” for drug regulation.121 While Judge Zobel charac-
terized the object of the FDA as “mak[ing] drugs available to promote and protect
the public health,”122 this is an “entirely aspirational . . . mission statement”123 that
ignores the fact that “Congress crafted the current version of the licensing scheme
for new drugs in order to prevent the introduction of unsafe or ineffective pharma-
ceutical products.”124
118 With apologies to Justice Alito in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct.
2466, 2478 (2013) (“Adopting the First Circuit’s stop-selling rationale would mean . . . the
vast majority—if not all—of the cases in which the Court has found impossibility pre-
emption, were wrongly decided.”).
119 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
120 See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–67, 574–75 (2009) (examining the legisla-
tive history of the FDA and, in some cases, lack of legislation as evidence of the Congressional
purpose of the FDA); Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2493–94 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (once
again examining legislative history, but also looking at amici curiae briefs); Zogenix v.
Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014) (quoting 21
U.S.C. § 393(b) (2012), the mission statement of the FDA); see also Noah, supra note 8, at
8–12 (criticizing Judge Zobel’s characterization of the FDA’s purpose and discussing its
purpose generally).
121 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573.
122 Zogenix, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S.
861, 881 (2000)).
123 Noah, supra note 8, at 9.
124 Id. at 8.
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It can probably be safely assumed that the FDA would not support this interpre-
tation of its preemptive power for any drug it has already approved and would argue
that its decision preempts the state ban. This is not an issue, however, even though
some weight is given to an agency’s view of “federal objectives when ‘the subject
matter is technica[l] and the relevant history and background are complex and
extensive.’”125 While some weight should be given to the FDA’s view of its own
preemptive power, its conclusion is not deferred to, only its view of how allowing
a certain regulation would affect the regulatory scheme.126 This model acknowledges
that some disruption of the federal scheme will be necessary to allow states to ban
FDA-approved drugs and so requires less deference to the FDA’s position. Waver-
ing opinions of the FDA on its preemptive power,127 opinions found exclusively in
briefs filed for litigation,128 and views held without any consultation with the
public,129 should all reduce the deference given to the FDA.130 Thus, under this
framework, very little leeway should be given to the FDA’s view of preemption
absent direct “regulations, preambles, interpretive statements, and responses to
125 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576 (quoting Geier, 529 U.S. at 883); see Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S.
Ct. at 2494 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (describing the amount of leeway to give federal
agencies’ view of preemptive effect).
126 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 576.
127 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (holding that agency inconsistency does not eliminate Chevron deference, but it may
strengthen the case for arbitrary and capricious change from standard practice).
128 Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (refusing to give special
weight to FDA’s statements because all of its positions were stated in briefs filed in litigation).
129 See id. (“[T]he FDA in developing its views has held no hearings on the matter or so-
licited the opinions, arguments, and views of the public . . . .”).
130 Further, without getting too deep into judicial deference to agency positions, under
King v. Burwell, the FDA would be entitled to even less deference if the drug’s availability can
be argued to be a matter of “deep ‘economic and political significance.’” See 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2489 (2015) (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444
(2014)) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to the IRS). However, the preemptive effect of
the FDA’s prescription drug approval does not seem to be the type of regulatory “elephant”
that the Supreme Court is concerned with. See id. (“[H]ad Congress wished to assign that
question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly.”); see also Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (“Congress . . . does not, one might say, hide
elephants in mouseholes.”). Some commentators believe that this may be a death knell for
agency deference, especially in combination with the ascension of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme
Court. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps) Unintended Consequences of King v.
Burwell, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 56 (discussing Chevron deference post–King v. Burwell); Richard
J. Pierce, Jr., The Future of Deference, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2016) (also discussing
the tenuous future of Chevron); Jonathan H. Adler, Should Chevron Be Reconsidered? A
Federal Judge Thinks So., WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/08/24/should-chevron-be-recon
sidered-a-federal-judge-thinks-so/?utm_term=.55e56c1c3d84 [https://perma.cc/45T4-TFPQ]
(discussing Judge Gorsuch’s decision against Chevron deference).
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comments.”131 Therefore, FDA views of the preemptive power, at least when it
comes to the effect on the full federal drug licensing scheme, should be downplayed.
One essential piece of this model, and an area where the FDA’s opinion should
be given weight, is the specific inclusion of a medical value component to the FDA’s
purpose. Since its founding, the FDA has had as its primary purpose the object of
showing whether the benefits of using a product or eating a food is worth the risk.132
In his dissent to Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Justice Breyer specifically noted value
as important to the calculation of object preemption, writing, “[O]ne might infer
that, the more medically valuable the drug, the less likely Congress intended to
permit a State to drive it from the marketplace.”133 Focusing on the FDA’s purpose
of proving value in drugs, a court should find no obstacle preemption for a unilateral
drug ban where the drug adds little to no value to the medical community. Though
simply being an additional treatment option may be valuable in and of itself,134 as
the amount of similar treatments rises, each individual slightly loses some of this
“additional option” value. With more and more substitutes that functionally have the
same effect (e.g., an opioid pain reliever), the likelihood that Congress intended to
have that specific option available in that certain state fails. Critics, including Judge
Zobel, will cite to Geier,135 arguing that the FDA’s intent in approving a drug is to
expand the arsenal of pharmaceuticals a doctor has at his or her disposal and so is
preempted. However, this is an unreasonable expansion of the holding in that case.
In Geier, the legislative history and comments of the Department of Transportation
(DOT) all pointed towards the intention of the DOT that there be a wide variety of
safety measures,136 whereas the FDA has no statements matching this level of ex-
tensiveness for any drug.137
131 Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring)) (refusing to give special weight
to the FDA’s statements because all of its positions were stated in briefs filed in litigation).
132 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–67 (2009) (“Congress became increasingly concerned
about unsafe drugs and fraudulent marketing, and it enacted the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). It required every manufacturer to submit a new drug application . . . to
the FDA for review. Until its application became effective, a manufacturer was prohibited
from distributing a drug . . . . In 1962, Congress amended the FDCA and shifted the burden
of proof from the FDA to the manufacturer. Before 1962, the agency had to prove harm to
keep a drug out of the market, but the amendments required the manufacturer to demonstrate
that its drug was ‘safe’. . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
133 133 S. Ct. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134 See, e.g., News Release, supra note 17 (“Zohydro ER will offer prescribers an additional
therapeutic option to treat pain, which is important because individual patients may respond
differently to different opioids.”).
135 See 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
136 See id. at 874–81 (examining the legislative history and contemporaneous comments
of the DOT).
137 Compare News Release, supra note 17, with Geier, 529 U.S. at 874–81 (citing generally
49 Fed. Reg. 28962 (1984)). Although the news release does mention diversity in prescription
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This must be a particularly demanding inquiry into the medical value of the drug
at issue. Simply because a drug has one or two substitutes or is not as powerful as
other drugs on the market does not mean a drug should be at risk to become illegal
in a state. In order to succeed on the merits under this modified framework, the state
must show that either new information has come to light, which renders the FDA’s
initial value judgment no longer correct, or that the particular local concerns of the
state are substantial enough to justify depriving potential patients who may need that
drug. If a state is attempting to show that the FDA’s initial value judgment is
incorrect due to new information, the state would have a duty to show that this is
actually new information about the risks or benefits of a drug that the FDA had no
opportunity to consider and the state had no opportunity to alert the FDA before the
drug was approved.138 In weighing the local concerns, courts should take into con-
sideration availability of substitutes, potential benefits and risks of the drug compared
to similar products, amount of potential users in that state, and how substantial the
local concerns actually are when compared to the rest of the nation.
In the case of Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, the whole premise of the public health
emergency was the overprescription and overavailability of opioids before Zohydro
was even approved for sale.139 It is assumed that, on appeal, the FDA would have
submitted a brief in favor of preemption.140 The FDA’s conclusion of preemption
would not be taken as fact, however,141 and its testimony as to the effect of removal
of Zohydro ER on the federal scheme would almost certainly not amount to the level
needed to find preemption. Although this would aid Massachusetts’s argument, the
state would not enjoy some of the presumptions that benefitted the plaintiff in
Wyeth.142 Namely, unlike in the state tort context considered by Wyeth, Congress has
not “indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest”
opioids as “important,” it does not go nearly as far as statements in the legislation as far as
deliberate desire for a variety.
138 Some models of preemption in the drug context have focused almost exclusively on
whether the State had any opportunity to make comments to the FDA prior to approval. See
Sharkey, supra note 22, at 1625–29 (“Judicial deference to the FDA’s position is only proper
where the FDA can show that it invited states an opportunity to express health and safety
concerns during the approval process.”); see also Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2481
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“At the same time, the agency can develop an informed position on
the pre-emption question by providing interested parties with an opportunity to present their
views. . . . [T]he FDA, in developing its views, has held no hearings on the matter or
solicited the opinions, arguments, and views of the public . . . .”).
139 See No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2014).
140 See James M. Beck, The FDA’s Amicus Curiae Briefs on Preemption—Redux, DRUG
& DEVICE L. (Oct. 19, 2007), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2007/10/fdas-amicus
-curiae-briefs-on-preemption.html [https://perma.cc/PG5M-84AX] (providing examples of
the FDA submitting briefs in support of preemption).
141 See supra notes 125–32 and accompanying text.
142 See 555 U.S. 555, 565–66 (2009).
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in the case of state bans of prescription drugs.143 As one of the first attempts to ban
a drug after receiving FDA approval, Congress has certainly not indicated an aware-
ness of Massachusetts’s power to reject an FDA-approved pharmaceutical. In the
future however, this Note recommends that Congress explicitly comment on the
preemptive power of FDA approval.
The analysis would then proceed to the question of value. This is not a case where
new information has surfaced about a prescription. In fact, the concerns that led Gov-
ernor Patrick to ban Zohydro are the same concerns that were considered and
brought up by the advisory committee and numerous public health officials.144 Further,
Massachusetts did have an opportunity to comment on the decision to approve
Zohydro ER and did not send a representative.145 Because new information is not on
the table, the only way for Massachusetts to avoid preemption under this new frame-
work would be to show that its local conditions are substantially bad enough to
justify non-preemption. With regards to available substitutes, the backlash to Zohydro
ER revolved around the availability of other opioids.146 Though there was the small
benefit of added prescription flexibility, along with the slight benefit of not containing
an analgesic,147 there seem to be no other benefits of Zohydro over other prescription
opioid pain medications.148 Additionally, Zogenix did not have abuse-resistant fea-
tures at the time, unlike some of its major competitors and substitutes.149 Although
critics today will point out that the risks of a hydrocodone-only drug were over-
blown,150 the potential risks of Zohydro were significant at the time, with the outside
Advisory Committee’s opinion and the reaction in the medical community to Zohydro
both extremely concerned with possibility of abuse.151 Testimony from the FDA
would probably be necessary to determine the amount of potential patients affected.
The bulk of the analysis under this framework for cases of states attempting to
ban FDA-approved drugs is whether the local conditions of that particular state
warrant leeway. In the case of Zohydro ER, Massachusetts most likely would have
143 Id. at 575 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc., v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
166–67 (1989)).
144 See supra Part I.
145 See Sharkey, supra note 22, at 1625–26 (“The FDA offered state officials the opportunity
to attend . . . its public drug advisory committee meetings regarding Zohydro and even to register
ahead of time in order to make comments at these events. But not a single state official . . .
spoke or even attended the advisory committee’s public meeting.” (citations omitted)).
146 See Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass.
Apr. 15, 2014); see also supra Part I.
147 See Noah, supra note 8, at 5 (discussing the benefits of an opioid without a combined
analgesic).
148 See News Release, supra note 17; see also RISK ASSESSMENT AND RISK MITIGATION
REVIEW(S): ZOHYDRO ER, supra note 22, at 1.
149 See Noah, supra note 8, at 5 (“[I]n contrast to the currently marketed versions of
OxyContin, Zohydro failed to incorporate any abuse-resistant features.”).
150 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
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succeeded. As stated earlier, Massachusetts ranked thirteenth in most drug overdoses
in 2014, a number substantially driven by opioids, legal and illegal.152 Massachusetts
also had 10.9% of its entire population taking some form of Schedule II opioid by
prescription alone in 2014, with enough pills sold to give every resident of Massa-
chusetts his or her own bottle.153 The state would need to show more statistics, including
comparisons to the rest of the country at the time of the FDA approval, but overall,
under this framework, Massachusetts could meet its standard of a substantial showing.
Taken together, these facts that Governor Patrick could produce would lead to
a finding of no preemption. Because the need is so great and the value of the drug
is so low compared to other available substitutes, a court should give the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts leeway in passing this law, as it does not “stand[ ] as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.”154 Under this new framework, the state law banning hydrocodone-only
products without abuse-resistant features would be un-preempted under the Suprem-
acy Clause of the Constitution.155
Looking briefly at the other legislation passed by Governor Patrick after the
preliminary injunction was granted by Judge Zobel,156 even if a court found under
this modified framework that Massachusetts’s ban was preempted, the requirement of
a letter of medical necessity verifying other treatments have failed before receiving a
prescription of Zohydro would certainly not be an obstacle to the object of the FDA.157
In this situation, even with the local conditions of Massachusetts remaining exactly the
same,158 the medical value lost through the legislation is even smaller because the drug
is still available, just in a more restricted form.159 Further, the Commonwealth would
benefit from the historic police power of the states to regulate doctor prescriptions.160
152 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
153 See MASS. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, MA PRESCRIPTION MONITORING PROGRAM COUNTY-
LEVEL DATA MEASURES (CALENDAR YEAR 2014) 2 (2015), http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/docs
/dph/quality/drugcontrol/county-level-pmp/pmp-county-data-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc
/NMY5-M4XD] (detailing county by county data on opioid use in Massachusetts in 2014).
154 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
155 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
156 Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 3339610, at *1–2 (D. Mass.
July 8, 2014), vacated in part, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 4273251 (D. Mass. Aug. 28,
2014) (describing the required procedures under 243 MASS. CODE REGS. 2.07(25) (2014) and
247 MASS. CODE REGS. 8.05(3) (2014)).
157 See Zogenix, 2014 WL 4273251, at *2.
158 See supra notes 107, 153 and accompanying text.
159 Zogenix, 2014 WL 3339610, at *3 (“The regulation does not require physicians to pre-
scribe other opioids or subject patients to medically ill-advised treatments before prescribing
Zohydro. The regulation gives physicians far more flexibility than plaintiff is willing to admit.”
(internal citation omitted)).
160 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270–71 (2006) (discussing state power to
regulate the health care profession).
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Unlike in the analysis for the prescription drug ban, which would be a case of first im-
pression, Congress’s awareness and tolerance of the existence of this state power
alongside the FDA’s drug licensing scheme would bolster Massachusetts’s argument
against preemption.161 As Justice O’Connor wrote in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder
Craft Boats, Inc., “The case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Con-
gress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal
interest, and has nonetheless decided to ‘stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever
tension there [is] between them.’”162 Taking into consideration that presumption, as
well as the smaller loss of medical value by not outright banning the pharmaceutical,
under this Note’s framework for preemption, the letter of medical necessity would
not be preempted by the FDA’s approval of Zohydro.
B. Impossibility Preemption
Although Governor Patrick’s law may pass muster under object preemption, it
must also be non-preempted under implied impossibility preemption. In Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, the Court seemingly expanded federal impossibility
preemption doctrine beyond a true impossibility standard.163 The Court also seem-
ingly expanded such a definition of impossibility to state positive law as well by
equating the tort liability with a positive state law.164 Unlike the concurrence by
Justice Thomas,165 which is tacitly endorsed by the majority in Mutual Pharmaceuti-
cal Co.,166 this Note advocates a true impossibility standard like the one discussed
in Wyeth v. Levine.167
In order for a state to ever have the opportunity to ban an FDA-approved drug, it
is necessary that the Court reject the impossibility standard it set in Mutual Pharma-
ceutical Co., as some commentators have already started to do.168 Under a true
161 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 575 (2009).
162 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238,
256 (1984)).
163 See 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2477 (2013) (finding impossibility when a company could accept
a tort claim or stop selling in a state to comply with both laws).
164 Id. at 2479 (“[S]tatutory ‘mandate[s]’ do precisely the same thing [as the threat of adverse
tort judgments]: They require a manufacturer to choose between leaving the market and accept-
ing the consequences of its actions (in the form of a fine or other sanction)”). Noah seems to
believe that the Court’s liberal and conservative justices may flip on the issue of state positive
law, however. See Noah, supra note 8, at 34 n.137 (discussing instances of Sotomayor poten-
tially believing state positive law is preempted).
165 See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 582–604 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating an elimination of
object preemption and slightly expanding impossibility preemption).
166 See 133 S. Ct. at 2470–80 (deciding a preemption case without citing Wyeth as precedent
or mentioning object preemption at all in support of its analysis).
167 555 U.S. at 568–73 (calling impossibility preemption a “demanding defense” and finding
no impossibility).
168 See Noah, supra note 8, at 54 (“Because pharmaceuticals run the gamut on these various
measures, a state’s decision to deprive patients of access to a drug licensed by the FDA would
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impossibility standard, it is not physically impossible for a pharmaceutical company
to have FDA approval and still have a product banned in a state or two.169 Like the
dissents in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. stated, the company could either stop selling
the drug in the state or pay the fine associated with breaking the law against selling
the drug.170 The state attempting to ban the drug would have to keep fines for
breaking the ban limited, however, otherwise the case gets closer and closer to being
impliedly preempted by impossibility.171 Without restricting the holding of Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. and returning to a standard of strict impossibility in drug ban
cases, the whole framework falls apart.172 It is thus essential that a state trying to ban
a drug keeps fines minimal and that the Court draws back part of the holding in
Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. for this framework to ever find a ban not preempted.
In Zogenix, under a true impossibility standard, the ban of Zohydro would not
be preempted. In her order granting the preliminary injunction, Judge Zobel based
her decision exclusively on implied object preemption, stating that the “emergency
order thus stands in the way of ‘the accomplishment and execution of’ an important
federal objective.”173 Judge Zobel does not even mention impossibility preemption
in her grant.174 A true impossibility standard is a “demanding” standard to meet,175
and only stems from “irreconcilable conflict”176 between two “irreconcilable affir-
mative requirements.”177 A pharmaceutical manufacturer like Zogenix would have
to show that it has no options but to violate either the Massachusetts ban or the
FDA’s approval of Zohydro. This is simply not the case when Zogenix could simply
stop selling in Massachusetts and continue selling in 49 other states.178
With a true impossibility standard and the object preemption framework estab-
lished earlier, Governor Patrick’s order to ban Zohydro ER until it adopted an
abuse-resistant formula would be upheld, unlike the actual result in Zogenix.179
not invariably run afoul of the Constitution, unless, of course, one takes seriously the Supreme
Court’s expansive approach to implied preemption in its latest tort decision, Mutual Pharma-
ceutical Co. v. Bartlett.”).
169 Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2480–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170 Id.; id. at 2482–96 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
171 Id. at 2481 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that high damage payments for avoiding con-
flict between federal and state law may lead to a finding of preemption).
172 See id. at 2469–80 (majority opinion) (finding that a state law subjecting a company to
a decision to stop selling their product or face liability is preempted).
173 Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr. 15,
2014) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
174 See id.
175 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 (2009).
176 Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2485 (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
177 Id.
178 See id. at 2491–92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
179 See 2014 WL 1454696, at *1.
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IV. OUTSIDE THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONTEXT
Although this modification to the framework for deciding federal preemption
cases accomplishes this Note’s stated goal of allowing a state to ban an FDA-
approved pharmaceutical, object preemption cases do not occur in a vacuum.180 Under
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, there is no special exemption allowing
for different results in a specific context simply because it is convenient.181 Although
a full examination of the implications of this model outside the prescription drug
case is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important that at least some of the
ramifications of this model in the greater preemption context be addressed.
In the great majority of cases, this model will result in exactly the same result
as the current preemption doctrine without any modification. Take, for example, the
world of immigration law. In 2012, the Supreme Court decided the immigration case
of Arizona v. United States.182 In relevant part, that case found an Arizona statute
that made “knowingly apply[ing] for work, solicit[ing] work in a public place or
perform[ing] work as an employee or independent contractor” a punishable misde-
meanor183 to be preempted under implied object preemption.184 Applying the modified
framework, which allows a reflection of the value, as represented through local con-
sideration,185 of a regulation like Arizona’s Section 5(C) to perhaps outweigh the
negatives would not make any difference.186 Although by virtue of being on the
southern border Arizona has a larger than average population of illegal immigrants,187
with an estimated 325,000 unauthorized aliens making up approximately 5% of its
total population in 2014,188 this would not add up to a significant local concern.
Around the country, there are states with significantly larger unauthorized immi-
grant populations, both by percent and as a total number.189 Further, Section 5(C)
180 See, e.g., id. at *1–2 (citing cases in the automobile safety (Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)) and immigration (Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941))
context to decide on a drug preemption case).
181 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
182 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
183 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2010).
184 Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403–07 (finding object preemption even without an explicit Con-
gressional statement forbidding punishment of illegal employees, as to allow punishment
would “interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress”).
185 See supra Section III.A.
186 See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 403–07.
187 See U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, PEW RES. CTR: HISPANIC
TRENDS (Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/P8DF-VKX5].
188 Id.
189 Id.
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would have a massive effect on a large population, subjecting them to criminal
liability just for seeking employment.190 Unlike the case of Zohydro, where there were
ample amounts of substitutes and the additional value of having one further opioid
was low,191 there is no easily available income-generating substitute for a job and the
value of not punishing immigrants for seeking work is great.192 Presumably there
would not be an issue with changing circumstances in this case, either, as the illegal
immigration population had not been increasing significantly in Arizona since 2009.193
Thus, the addition of a value check would not change the result in a case like Arizona.
Indeed, in most cases, local conditions will not rise to the level of significance
this framework would require. Absent near-emergency levels of health or safety
issues facing one single state, this model will turn out the exact same result as the
current preemption framework for decisions does.194 A state could not hijack this
framework by simply claiming exigent circumstances and overruling the federal
government. To do so would be a direct violation of the Supremacy Clause.195 Any
court applying this modified framework would require an incredibly significant
showing of facts surrounding the value to society of the legislation. Thus, in the vast
majority of cases, this modification would not alter the result at all. However, where
emergencies call for it, a balancing of the value in protecting the state should be done.
CONCLUSION
The Zogenix v. Patrick litigation provided an interesting opportunity to reexam-
ine federal preemption doctrine under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.196
Although the grant of a preliminary injunction and Governor Patrick’s subsequent
decision not to appeal did not allow any court to examine the merits, the next time
a case like this occurs, this Note suggests modifying the federal object preemption
doctrine to allow for certain bans when the need is great. This framework would not
result in state law replacing federal law as “the supreme Law of the Land,”197 but would
simply allow wiggle room when the need is severe. Where local conditions demand
it or a discovery of new information arises, this framework would provide states the
190 See supra notes 182–83 and accompanying text.
191 See supra Part I and Section III.A.
192 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 405 (2012) (“IRCA’s framework reflects a
considered judgment that making criminals out of aliens engaged in unauthorized work—aliens
who already face the possibility of employer exploitation because of their removable status—
would be inconsistent with federal policy and objectives.”).
193 See U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, supra note 187 (documenting
no significant change in unauthorized population from 2009–2014).
194 See supra Section III.A.
195 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
196 See id.; Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick, No. 14-11689-RWZ, 2014 WL 1454696, at *1 (D. Mass.
Apr. 15, 2014).
197 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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much-needed leeway to ban a potentially dangerous pharmaceutical. This would
require a return to a Wyeth standard instead of the new Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.
one that is currently in place, but the switch would be worth it to promote states’ rights
to protect its citizens from problems that perhaps were not reflected in the FDA’s
calculation. It would also allow the state to place pressure on pharmaceutical com-
panies like Zogenix to improve the safety or efficacy of their drugs.
In the current case of the American opioid epidemic, the need for states to be
able to fight on an individual level is severe. Without allowing the states the ability
to combat the harsh local conditions they might face, the epidemic may continue to
spiral out of control, taking more and more lives with it. By adopting this framework
for federal preemption decisions, especially in the pharmaceutical case, lives may
be saved and the nation can begin fighting back, one state at a time.
